The Significance of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome & Human Rights
|
Shawn H.E. Harmon*
|
|
Modern
medical research, particularly genetic research, is changing the nature of
medicine. Concerns surrounding these changes and their potential negative
impact on human rights led UNESCO to spearhead collaboration by experts in
the creation of an international instrument intended to provide guidance for
the promotion of bioethics and the protection of human rights in the genetic
context. The result was the Universal Declaration of the Human Genome and
Human Rights. This article briefly highlights the scientific and social
setting into which the Declaration was injected. This is followed by a
consideration of the drafting body (the IBC) so as to assess whether UNESCO
was the appropriate body to lead this project. The process by which the
Declaration was created is also considered so as to assess whether it
represents an example of ethical and democratic drafting. Finally, the
substantive content of the Declaration is considered and measured against the
pre-existing regime so as to assess whether it represents an intelligible and
coherent response to the concerns raised capable of offering guidance now and
into the future. By assessing these procedural and substantive matters, one
can draw some tentative conclusions about the utility and significance of the
Declaration.
|
|
DOI:
10.2966/scrip.020105.20
©
Shawn Harmon 2005. This work is licensed through SCRIPT-ed Open Licence
(SOU.
|
|
Shawn
H.E. Harmon, BA (1993), LLB (1996), LLM (2005), has clerked with the Federal
Court of Canada and practiced extensively in Nova Scotia as a litigator,
primarily in the fields of insurance and tort law. He received his LLM (with
distinction) in international law from the University of Edinburgh, and has
returned to the University of Edinburgh to both undertake research as a
Research Fellow with INNOGEN and to pursue his PhD studies in genetic regulation.
|
|
[Human]
genetics ... is
beginning to create a new generation of acute and subtle dilemmas that will
in the new millennium transform the ways in which we think of ourselves and
of society. It is genetics, bringing both a new understanding of what we are
and almost daily developing new ways of enabling us to influence what we are,
that is creating a revolution in thought, and not least in ethics.1
The
inexorable advance of science is expanding the breadth and scope of human
activity. Nowhere is its impact more acute than in the health and related
fields, where it has contributed to a sea change in individual and community
healthcare. It has made healthcare more predictive, increased treatment
options, expanded healthcare programs and altered the social setting within
which medicine is practiced.2 It has huge potential to alleviate
suffering and increase quality of life. The intimate interaction between
scientific advances and health led to concerns about the pace of advances,
the dearth of applicable legal standards, and the social consequences of the
application of biotechnology within existing healthcare systems.
Unsurprisingly, genetic advances play an
increasingly important role in the scientific advances that impact healthcare.
Although genetics has the potential to increase healthcare options, it also
gives rise to fears. It offers knowledge about humanity’s vital mechanisms
and the capability to influence and modify them, which prompts fears that
attempts to control present health could injure future health.3 It
offers the capability to “design” the humans of the future, which, given past
abusive eugenic practices,4 excited anxiety over sex and genetic
discrimination and the development of heretofore unheard of liability claims.5
It offers the possibility of transforming the
|
|
J.
Harris, “Introduction: The Scope and Importance of Bioethics” in J. Harris
(ed.), Bioethics (Oxford: OUP, 2001), at
20.
|
|
D.
Morgan, “Science, Medicine and Ethical Change” in A. Bainham et al. (eds.), Body
Lore and Laws (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 329-342, at 329. For
more on these, see N. Matsaniotis, “The Evolution of Technology, Genetics and
Bioethics” in L. Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), Scientific and Technological Developments and Human
Rights (Athens: Sakkoulas Publishers, 2001) 161-170, at 164, V.
Harpwood, “Gene Therapy Treatment for Parkinson’s Disease” (2002) 9(11)
M.L.M. 2-4, V. Harpwood, “Malaria Likely to be Conquered by Geneticists”
(2002) 9(11) M.L.M. 5, and T. Beauchamp, “On Justifications for Coercive
Genetic Control” in J. Humber & R. Almeder (eds.), Biomedical Ethics and the Law (London: Plenum
Press, 1977) 361-374, at 363.
|
|
We
are only at the beginning of understanding. Research has not yet produced a
single broadly applicable therapeutic treatment. Even if gene therapy were
possible (it remains a dream), interventions could have unforeseen
consequences. For example, upon discovery of the sickle cell anaemia gene,
its link to resistance to malaria was discovered. See T. Caulfield,
“Underwhelmed: Hyperbole, Regulatory Policy and the Genetic Revolution”
(2000) 45 McGill L.J. 437-460, at 440-445, and E. Marden & D. Nelkin,
“Displaced Agendas: Current Regulatory Strategies for Germline Gene Therapy”
(2000) 45 McGill L.J. 461-481.
|
|
A
common example is that of the Nazis, but there are others: M. Kirby, Through the World's Eye (Sydney: The Federation
Press, 2000), at 44-45.
|
|
Examples
include the emergence of (1) “informational claims” by individuals for whom
biotechnology has altered the structure of human kinship, (2) “wrongful life”
claims by “defective” individuals seeking compensation for their diminished
ability to achieve the autonomy, interpersonal relationships and personal
development as a result of improperly utilized biotechnology, and (3)
|
|
species,
which, given certain healthcare shortfalls (i.e., the organ transplant crisis6),
leads to distress over healthcarers being pushed precipitously toward genetic
solutions.
Further,
genetic research/knowledge and the distribution of new genetic
biotechnologies are facilitated by a world in the throes of “globalization”,7
which contributed to concerns about the Human Genome Project (HGP)8 * *
* and the worldwide implications of its potential negative consequences.
Some concerns were expressed as follows:
[T]he
interdependence of developments in the world is felt more acutely today than
ever before. The HGP, ... which will lead to breakthroughs in the most
intimate knowledge of the biology of
|
|
“negligence claims” against genetic
counselors. See N. Lenoir, “The Human Genome: From UNESCO to the UN” in L.
Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), supra,
note 2, 171-178, L. Walters, “Reproductive Technologies and Genetics” in R.
Veatch (ed.), Medical Ethics,
2d ed. (London: Jones & Bartlett, 1997) 209-233, at 212, and B. Knoppers et al., “Physicians and Genetic
Malpractice” (2002) 21 Med. Law 661-680.
|
|
R.
Vermot-Mangold (Rapporteur), Trafficking
in Organs in Europe (2003) Doc. 9822, J. Montgomery, Health Care Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: OUP,
2003), and many more.
|
|
Globalization
is characterized by increasing (1) cross-border integration of political,
economical and cultural practices and dissemination of values and
information, (2) control of infrastructure (ie: transport, utilities, emergency
services, banking, security) by computer; and (3) transnational mobility of
people, disease, products/technology and capital. See R. Rogers, “Identity
Revisited in the New Technological Culture” (2000) 19 Med. Law 381-387, at
382, and P. Bates, “Health, Law, Ethics and Policy: Challenges and New
Avenues for the 21st Century and New Millennium” (1999) 18 Med. Law 13-46.
For more on globalization, see D. Henwood, “Beyond Globophobia” (2003) at www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/2003/1113
globophobia.htm (July 10/04),
IMF, “Globalization: Threat
or Opportunity?” (2002) at
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm
(July 10/04), C. Norchi, “The Global Divide” (2000) at www.globalpolicv.org/socecon/tncs/davos/davos10.htm
(July 10/04), L. Sklair, “Competing Conceptions of Globalization”
(1999) 5 J.W.S.R. 143, C. Chase-Dunn, “Globalization: A World- Systems
Perspective” (1999) 5 J.W.S.R. 165, J. Breidenbach & I. Zukrigl, “The
Dynamics of Cultural Globalization” (1998) at www.inst.at/studies/collab/breidenb.htm
(July 10/04), C. Sjolander, “The Rhetoric of Globalization:
What’s in a Wor(l)d?” (1996) 51 Int’l J. 603, P. Cerny, “Globalization and
Other Stories: The Search for a New Paradigm for International Relations”
(1996) 51 Int’l J. 617, W. Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law” (1990) 84 A.J.I.L. 866. Both www.emorv.edu/soc/globalization.issues01.html and
|
|
www.globalization.about.com/cs/whatsit/a/whatsit.htm
(July 10/04), provide further links to a host of sources.
|
|
8 The Human Genome Project (HGP) is a global collaborative
scientific endeavour with the
|
|
goal of mapping and sequencing the entire
chain of human DNA and genes. Begun in the 1980s, it
|
|
involves
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK, the
US, regional organizations such as the EU, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such as the WHO. The Human Genome Organization (HUGO), an independent
organization of international scientists, coordinates the research and
fosters collaboration among scientists so as to avoid competition and
duplication. The genome is now 99% mapped and researchers are moving into the
functional analysis and genetic variation phases. It has been described
positively as “one of the most ambitious scientific
|
|
projects
ever undertaken”, and negatively as a process “driven by an opportunistic
technology, an avaricious lobby and misguided goals”. See A. Taylor,
“Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy to
Advance Human Rights and Public Health” (1999) 25 A.J.L.M. 479541, E.
Ben-Asher et al., “Harvesting the Human Genome: The
Israeli Perspective” (2000) 2 I.M.A.J. 657-664, S. MacLean & D. Giesen,
“Legal and Ethical Considerations of the Human Genome Project” (1994) 1
M.L.I. 159, and A. Lippman, “Led (Astray) by Genetic Maps: The Cartography of
the Human Genome and Health Care” (1992) 25 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1496, for
further background on the HGP.
|
|
human
beings, requires true international cooperation and an unrestricted exchange
of information, firstly because of the returns this can have with relation to
research and application and, secondly, because of the need for international
analysis of the societal, ethical and ... legal implications this project
could engender.9
|
|
And:
|
|
Scientific
and technological progress [permits] increasing control of our environment
and ... our
living conditions. In the fields of biology and genetics especially, progress
is all the more staggering since man, for the first time, has the power to
transform living matter in a programmed and selective manner. . It is above
all in the biomedical field that progress has been the most spectacular and
provokes the most questions, especially since it involves living human
beings.10
|
|
The “age of genetics”11 was
viewed as a “risk society”12 with the potential for catastrophic
harm.13 It demanded “lengthened foresight” to “help disclose what
is possibly at stake, what values and traditions we may pass up, what goals
and opportunities we ought, in all conscience, to deny ourselves; what we
must avoid ... [and] preserve at all cost.”14
This
led Federico Mayor, Director-General of the United Nations Economic, Social
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),15 to conclude that UNESCO
needed to
|
|
F. Mayor, “Statement at ‘Genetics, Ethics
and Human Values: Human Genome Mapping, Genetic Screening and Gene Therapy’”
24th CIOMS Conference, Japan, 1990. An international response was also
warranted because of the international awareness that globalization linkages
was creating about scientific possibilities and issues. For more on these
linkages and the evolving “global” awareness, see UN Secretary-General, Report: An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., UN Doc.
A/47/277-S/34111 (1992).
|
|
N. Lenoir, “Annual Report of the IBC” in Proceedings of the Second Session of the IBC,
vol. I (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), 1-9, at 1.
|
|
R. Brownsword et
al., “Human Genetics and the Law: Regulating a Revolution” in
R. Brownsword et al. (eds.), Law and Human Genetics: Regulating a Revolution
(Oxford: OUP, 1999) 15, at 5.
|
|
Wherein we look not at what nature can do
but at what we can do, thereby circumventing “fate”: see D. Morgan, supra, note 2, at 331-332, and U. Beck,
Risk Society: Toward A New Modernity (London:
Sage, 1992), who coined the phrase “risk society”.
|
|
13 Indeed, most initial responses
to genetic breakthroughs were reactionary, emotive, precipitous and negative.
For more on this, see M. Lupton, “To Clone or Not to Clone - Whither the
Law?” (1999) 18 Med. Law 107-123.
|
|
D.
Morgan, supra, note 2, at 341, quoting Hans
Jonas, a German philosopher. See also S. Murphy, “Biotechnology and
International Law” (2001) 42 Harv. I.L.J. 47-139, and S. Benatar, “A
Perspective from Africa on Human Rights and Genetic Engineering” in J. Burley
(ed.), The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights
(Oxford: OUP, 1999) 159-189, for a discussion of the science and its
applications and the human rights concerns surrounding its use.
|
|
15
|
|
UNESCO is a specialized agency formed
pursuant to art. 57 of the United Nations Charter.
|
|
contribute
“more fully to the construction of a common human destiny grounded on the
essential values of mankind.”16 He understood that, like
developments on the scientific side, effective legal and ethical responses
would have to be coordinated globally. An international initiative reliant on
universal standards derived largely from the International Bill of Rights
(IBR), which includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),17
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),18
and the International Covenant on Economical, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),19 could be coordinated through UNESCO.20
Thus, in 1993, UNESCO’s newly created International Bioethics Committee (IBC)
began drafting an international bioethics instrument specifically directed at
human rights and genetics.21
|
|
16
|
|
F. Mayor, “Preface” in Proceedings of the First Session of the IBC
(Paris: UNESCO, 1994).
|
|
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc.
A/811 (1948).
|
|
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 171, and its Optional Protocol, GA Res.
2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).
|
|
International Covenant on Economical,
Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
|
|
Authored
by a broad cross-section of ideologically opposed states in the aftermath of
WWII, and enjoying a high level of consensus in a variety of cultures, the
IBR (or parts of it) is widely accepted as representative of universal
standards. Its “universal” status is bolstered by the inclusion of its key
principles in numerous international and regional instruments. For example,
see the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention
on Human Rights (1969), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(1981), the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994), and many other Conventions
and Declarations. Even the largely odious Bangkok Declaration (1993) evokes a
common understanding of equality and non-discrimination. Otherwise it has
been roundly and correctly criticized as a cynical and politically-motivated
relativistic instrument intended to empower specific Asian regimes against
opposition, both domestically and internationally: see H. Samuels, “Hong Kong
on Women, Asian Values and the Law” (1999) 21 H.R. Quart. 707-734, and E.
Lee, “Human Rights and Non-Western Values” in M. Davis (ed.), Human Rights and Chinese Values (Oxford:
OUP, 1995) 72-90, at 87-88.
|
|
For more on the IBR, its history and
universality, see A. Taylor, supra,
note 8, at 502-505, K. Appiah, “Citizens of the World” in M. Gibney (ed.), Globalizing Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2003)
189-232, M. Glendon, “The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on
the Universal Human Rights Idea” (2003) 16 Harv. H.R.J. 27-40, at 27 and 31,
R. Andorno, “Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law: In Search of a
Global Consensus” (2002) 80(12) WHO Bulletin 959-963, R. Macklin, Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search
for Ethical Universals in Medicine (Oxford: OUP, 1999), J. Mann
et al., “Human Rights and Public
Health” in J. Mann et al. (eds.), Health and Human Rights (London:
Routledge, 1999) 7-20, S. Goonesekere, “Nationality and Women’s Human Rights:
The Asia/Pacific Experience” in A. Byrnes et al.
(eds.), Advancing the Human Rights of Women: Using International Human Rights Standards in
Domestic Litigation (London:
Commonwealth
Secretariat, 1996) 86-100, at 87-88, A. Cassese, Human
Rights in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), T.
Buergenthal, International Human Rights in
a Nutshell (Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1988), at 17-18.
21 This overt linking was a
predictable step in the evolution of both disciplines. Human rights, from the
UDHR to the present, has been motivated by the desire to safeguard “human
dignity” generally. Bioethics (often framed by autonomy, beneficence,
non-maleficence and justice), although directed at enhancing the availability
and quality of healthcare, often both draws and impacts on “human dignity”.
For more on “human dignity”, see paras. 1 and 5 of the Preamble and art. 1 of
the UDHR, R. Andorno, ibid, at 960,
O. Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” in H. Steiner & P.
Alston (eds.), International Human Rights in
Context, 2d ed. (London: Cambridge U. Press, 2000), 400-402, at
400-401, R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1977), and others.
|
|
The offspring of UNESCO’s efforts, the
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (the Declaration),
was adopted by the General Conference in 1997,22 and by the UN
General Assembly in 1998.23
The following article assesses both the
process of the Declaration’s creation and the substance of its provisions,
with a view to assessing its significance and determining whether the
rationale for drafting it (as identified above) has been realized. Part 1
undertakes a “process examination”. First, it considers the Declaration’s
authors (UNESCO/IBC) to determine whether they were entitled and best
situated to act. Second, it highlights the drafting process to determine
whether what was adopted was ethical or democratic and thereby in keeping
with the spirit of the instrument itself. Part 2 undertakes a “substance
examination”. First, it reviews some of the pre-existing international human
rights instruments that influenced the Declaration’s creation to determine
whether a new instrument was warranted. Second, it considers the content of
the Declaration to determine whether it advances coherent foundational values
supported by effective substantive rights and, in addition, fills any gaps
left by the pre-existing regime. Having considered these issues, one may be
able to draw some conclusions about the significance of the Declaration and
its proper place in the international genetic and human rights regulatory
pantheon.
Pursuant
to its Constitution,24 UNESCO is comprised of a General
Conference,25 an Executive Board,26 and a Secretariat.27
It is further divided into five specialized
|
|
22
|
|
UNESCO General Conference Resolution 29
C/17, UNESCO GC, 29th Sess. (1997).
|
|
23 UN General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/53/152, UN GAOR, 53rd Sess. (1998).
|
|
Adopted in London on November 16, 1945,
when representatives from 37 states signed it, it came into force on November
4, 1946, when 20 signatories ratified it. The Constitution can be viewed at www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=Constitution (May 5/04).
|
|
The
General Conference is the primary decision-making body of UNESCO (see art.
IV). It is comprised of representatives of member states (each of which have
one vote) and associate member states together with observers from non-member
states, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The General
Conference meets every 2 years to elect Executive Board members, determine
policy directions and assess programs, and make budgetary decisions. UNESCO
derives its budget from member state assessments and extra-budgetary funding
from NGOs, IGOs and other private sector sources. For more on the General
Conference and budget/funding information, see www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=The Organization (May 10/04).
|
|
The Executive Board is composed of
representatives from 58 member states. Representatives are elected to reflect
the cultural and geographic diversity of UNESCO. It meets twice per year to
ensure that the decisions made by the General Conference are implemented and
to prepare the work of the General Conference. Its tasks are defined by the
Constitution (see art. V), the General Conference and agreements with the UN,
various specialized UN agencies and other IGOs, and includes advising the UN.
For more on this body, see www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=The Organization (May 10/04).
|
|
27 The Secretariat, structured and governed by art. VI of the
Constitution, consists of the Director-General and his or her staff. The
Director-General is the executive head of UNESCO. His or her role is to
formulate policies, proposals of action and budgetary recommendations for the
General Conference. The staff, some 2,000 people from 160 states as of April
2003, implement existing and
|
|
Sectors, one of which is the Human &
Social Sciences Sector.28 The IBC, established within this Sector,
was an ad
hoc body comprised of 50 independent experts in anthropology,
biology, genetics, law, medicine and philosophy, chosen by the
Director-General to reflect the geographical and cultural diversity of
UNESCO. It was approved by the General Conference29 and eventually
made permanent.30 The IBC’s general purposes are to:
1)
Raise issues and promote reflection and the
exchange of ideas regarding developments in the life sciences;
2)
Make recommendations and encourage action
among decision-makers (i.e., states, IGOs, NGOs and domestic bioethics
committees); and
3)
Disseminate the principles set out in the UDHR
and apply them to new technologies.31
Its specific remit was to conduct a debate on
the ethical, social, and human consequences of genetic developments and
prepare an international instrument for the protection of the human genome.32
The Director-General opined that UNESCO must
“play its full role in the world of the future [by conducting] a world-wide
debate on the ethical, social and human consequences of the development of
the life sciences.”33 Insofar as the IBC’s drafting process
created a global and cross-cultural debate on genetics, bioethics and human
rights, it fulfilled this goal and was in conformity with UNESCO’s
Constitutional purposes, which are, inter alia,
to:
1)
Develop and increase the means of
communication between peoples and employ them to promote mutual understanding
and a truer/better knowledge of each other’s lives;34
2)
Advance, through educational, scientific and
cultural relations, the objectives of international peace and common welfare
of mankind;35 and
|
|
newly developed programs and maintain 53
field offices around the world. For more on this body, see www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=The Organization (May 5/04).
|
|
28 The HSS Sector is tasked with helping people understand
and interpret the developing social, cultural and economic environment. It
does this by: (1) studying what is (providing imperical research); (2)
anticipating what could be (providing philosophical critiques); and (3)
determining what should be (providing ethics and human rights-based
analyses). Generally, it analyzes societal trends and tries to steer them in
directions supportive of the UDHR and its own institutional goals of
promoting education, discourse and peace. See www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=Social Sciences (May 20/04).
|
|
29 UNESCO General Conference Resolution 27 C/5.15, UNESCO GC,
27th Sess. (1993).
|
|
30 UNESCO Executive Board Resolution, UNESCO EB, 154th Sess.
(1998).
|
|
31
21/04).
|
|
Justice M. Kirby suggests that the impending
completion of the HGP made the choice of acting on genetics self-evident: M.
Kirby, “Inquiry re: Declaration” from j
saleh @hcourt. gov.au (May 20/04).
|
|
H. Espiell, Birth of the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
|
|
(Paris: UNESCO, 1999), at 1.
|
|
34
|
|
Preamble, para. 6.
|
|
3)
Contribute to peace and security by promoting
educational, scientific and cultural collaboration among states in order to
further universal respect for justice, rule of law and human rights affirmed
for all peoples without discrimination.36
These purposes are to be realized through
constitutionally-sanctioned activities, including cooperation with other
specialized agencies whose interests and activities are related to its own
purposes,37 and encouragement of cooperation and personnel
exchanges among states in all branches of intellectual activity.38
UNESCO is also empowered to collaborate in the preparation of international
agreements to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image.39
Indeed UNESCO collaboration in the preparation of international instruments
is neither new nor novel:
UNESCO,
the premier international organization in the fields of science, culture,
communications and education, has the legal authority to negotiate and
sponsor the codification and implementation of international instruments
advancing technology, public health and human rights.40
Its initiative is also defended as being:
... perfectly in line with the
objectives of this international organization ... [which is] “to contribute to
peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through
education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for
justice, for the rule of law and for human rights ...” because it is clear
that the increasing access to the human genome has profound implications for
human rights
... .41
Although UNESCO’s Constitution confers
authority to develop “conventions” and “recommendations”,42 not “declarations”, it is generally accepted
that
|
|
Preamble,
para. 7.
|
|
36 Article I(1).
|
|
37 Article XI.
|
|
38 Article I(2)(c).
|
|
39 Article I(2)(a).
|
|
40 A. Taylor, supra,
note 8, at 481. In fact, UNESCO has served as the forum for the preparation
of some 33 international conventions and a host of other instruments,
including the Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1960), the
Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation (1966),
the Recommendation Concerning the Status of Scientific Researchers (1974),
the Convention Concerning the Protection of Natural and Cultural World
Heritage (1972), and the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978). See
F. Mayor, Report of the Director-General, UNESCO, 29th Sess., Annex D, UNESCO
Doc. 29C/3 (1997).
|
|
R.
Andorno, “Seeking Common Ground on Genetic Issues: The UNESCO Declaration on
the Human Genome” in J. Sandor (ed.), Society
and Genetic Information: Codes and Laws in the Genetic Era
(Budapest: Central European University, 2003), 105-123, at 105. [hereinafter
paginated 1-12]
|
|
42
|
|
See art. IV(4).
|
|
recommendations
and declarations, both of which are non-binding (or “soft law”), are
substantively similar and the use of the latter does not invalidate the
initiative.43
Although UNESCO was still rehabilitating its
tarnished reputation,44 its IBC was the only global forum for
in-depth bioethical reflection.45 Few
other international
organizations could claim the same level of
experience and knowledge regarding science, its cross-cultural impact, and
its significance for human rights.46 Further, none of UNESCO’s
competitors or compatriots in the human rights field represent any measurable
improvement in representation or structure, nor do the instruments they have
drafted represent any significant improvement in form or content.47
Finally, it is not inappropriate for non-state entities like UNESCO to take
the lead on emerging issues. This is an unavoidable symptom of the new global
era where sovereignty has been re-conceptualized and such institutions (i.e.,
IMF, WIPO, WTO) take on international law-making functions.48
Given the above, UNESCO’s IBC was probably
the body best suited to prepare the first international instrument on
genetics. At the very least, it was within its broad remit to do so.
It
was recognized at the outset that the IBC’s task would be delicate because of
the diversity of ethical positions founded on divergent value systems
conditioned by disparate cultural and religious traditions and societal and
economic standings.49 The highlights of the drafting process,
which was conducted by a multi-national group of experts conscious of the
cultural, legal, philosophical, and religious milieu, are:
|
|
See A. Taylor, supra,
note 8, at 508, and the sources cited in his note 247. For more on the
considerations which went into the choice of drafting a declaration as
opposed to some other form of instrument, see H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 27-31.
|
|
44 A. Taylor, ibid,
at 525-526. UNESCO’s turbulent history and controversial activities, which
led to US (1985) and UK (1986) withdrawal, is well documented: see M. Allen,
“UNESCO and the ILO: A Tale of Two Agencies” (1985) 1 J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol. 391, and M. Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of
Norms: The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and Science
Policy” (1993) 47 Int’l Org. 565.
|
|
45 See H. Espiell, supra,
note 33, at 1, and www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=Social Sciences/Ethics/Bioethics/IBC (May
21/04).
|
|
46 A. Iles, “The Human Genome Project: A
Challenge to the Human Rights Framework” (1996) 9 Harv. H.R.J. 27-60, at 43.
|
|
47 The UN Commission on Human Rights represents an
alternative drafting institution, but has remained largely inactive,
appearing to adopt the view that the existing human rights framework is
adequate. In any event, an examination discloses no obvious advantage
(procedurally or otherwise) with respect to preparing an international
instrument on genetics. The Council of Europe has drafted the more broadly
applicable Biomedicine Convention (1998), but the Council of Europe is a
regional body, its Convention reflects the Declaration in several respects,
and it has not mandated significant departures from the existing member
practices. See A. Iles, ibid,
at 39-42.
|
|
48 R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother,
“Globalization and Human Rights” (1999) 21 H.R. Quart. 735-766, at 736-737.
|
|
49 N. Lenoir, “Report to the Director General on the Human Genome”
in Proceedings of the First Session of the IBC
(Paris: UNESCO, 1994) 3-20, at 16.
|
|
•
Drafting took 4 years. The IBC’s Legal
Commission conducted 8 meetings and the IBC held 4 sessions. These bodies
debated some 9 drafts.50 Although there was a body of key
contributors, every member of the IBC took part in the drafting of one
article or another, and most member states contributed.51 The
Declaration was finalized by a committee of government representatives from
81 member states.52
•
The IBC used broad consultative procedures; it
solicited learned papers and considered opinions from various domestic and
international bodies, and circulated at least one draft and questionnaire to
some 300 bodies—scientific, philosophical, legal, ethical, intergovernmental,
and UN—for comments and suggestions.53
•
Drafting was accompanied by a host of related
activities, such as support of fledgling bioethics training programs, conduct
of issue-specific genetic-related surveys, and sponsorship of various bioethics-related
domestic statutes.54 These fostered dialogue amongst public
decision-makers, experts and others and thereby broadened mutual
understanding and enhanced (bioethical) education with a view to promoting
justice, human welfare, and human rights principles.55
It
is claimed that the overall institutional framework emphasized the ethical
elements of scientific development, and that the drafting procedure modeled
an “ethical” drafting process based on the articulation of “consensus-based”
principles and rights, and was free of political influence and vested
interest pressures.56 Although this is largely true, politics
played some part, most noticeably in the late addition of specific
prohibitions in arts. 11 and 24. Regarding the art. 11 cloning prohibition,
it has been said:
|
|
We
know that the statement defining cloning as ‘contrary to human dignity’ was a
late addition by UNESCO to the text originally produced by [the IBC].
Moreover, one of the [IBC] members ... has
|
|
50
|
|
H. Espiell, supra,
note 33.
|
|
See
H. Espiell, ibid. F. Mayor
(Spain), H. Espiell (Uruguay) and N. Lenoir (France) dominate the documentary
background: see www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=Social
Sciences/Ethics/Bioethics/IBC
Documents (May4/04). Special contributions from B. Knoppers
(Canada), S. Altman (USA), and Gonzalo Yanez (Chile) are noted within the
documents: see H. Espiell, ibid, at
53. N. Lenoir, B. Knoppers and M. Jean (Canada) are also singled out by subsequent
IBC members: see M. Kirby, supra,
note 32, Q-5.
|
|
52
|
|
A. Taylor, supra,
note 8, at 509.
|
|
And the response resulted in a “wealth and
diversity of contributions” which were discussed at the Fifth Meeting of the
Legal Commission, September 25, 1995: see H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 6778, and Annex
VII.
|
|
F. Mayor, “Address by the Director General”
in Proceedings of the First Session of the IBC (Paris:
UNESCO, 1994) 63-67, at 63, and N. Lenoir, “Speech” in Proceedings of the Third Session of the IBC,
vol. I (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), 111-114, at 113.
|
|
55
|
|
H. Espiell, supra,
note 33, at 2.
|
|
56
|
|
N. Lenoir, supra,
note 5, at 172, N. Lenoir, supra,
note 49, at 16, and N. Lenoir, supra,
note
54, at 113, wherein she described the
process as “ethical” in that it was “transparent and interactive”.
|
|
reported
that ‘several delegations proposed not to rush in condemning any particular
technique, including cloning’.57
|
|
and:
|
|
It is my belief that the inclusion of
specific reference ... [to] banning reproductive cloning was added after
the IBC itself had finished its work and as a consequence of initiatives of ... Professor
Mayor.58
Similarly, a prohibition of germ-line
interventions was originally considered inappropriate,59 but
nevertheless found its way into art. 24, lending support to the allegation
that the Declaration is a “dignitarian instrument” created by a “dignitarian
alliance”:
... ‘[D]ignitarian’ because its
fundamental commitment is to the principle that human dignity should not be
compromised;
... ‘[A]lliance’ because there is more than one pathway to this
ethic - Kantian and communitarian as well as religious ... [and
each are represented in the supporters to the Declaration]. ... [T]he
dignitarian view gives voice to the interests of conservatism, constancy and
stability . [and] the concern that we should . hang on to those parts of the
human condition that are familiar and reassuringly ‘human’ [and it is
exemplified by the reproductive cloning and germ-line intervention
prohibitions].60
Analysis
of the drafting process permits only ambivalent conclusions. Certainly it was
ethical in that it solicited the learned opinions of a swathe of experts, and
the text was subject to extensive debate and numerous drafts. In short, and
as suggested above, it was inclusive of culture- and rights-sensitive men and
women from across the globe who attempted to articulate an instrument capable
of addressing both science and rights. All told, a compelling argument could
be made in support of the “commendable and largely ethical” process. However,
the process suffered from at least a couple incidents of political wrangling
and compromise. One might legitimately argue that compromise and
negotiation/wrangling support the democratic aspect of the Declaration’s
creation, and obviously trade-offs are a common feature in the democratic
process. However, the trade-offs identified above appear to have been
associated with tactics of questionable procedural merit in that they may
have been achieved “out-of-process”. The resultant provisions are the most
controversial and
|
|
57
|
|
J.
Harris, supra, note 1, at 64, who quotes M.
Revel as disclosing the discord or lack of
unanimity
on this point.
|
|
M. Kirby, supra,
note 32, Q-6. For more on the politics that shaped the final version of the Declaration,
see M. Revel, “Human Reproductive Cloning, Embryo Stem Cells and Germline
Gene Intervention: An Israeli Perspective” (2003) 22 Med. Law 701-732.
|
|
H.
Espiell, supra, note 33, at 58, citing the
comments at the 5th Meeting of the Legal Commission. In 1990, CIOMS concluded
that the possibility of germ-line interventions should remain open: A.
Taylor, supra, note 8, at 496.
|
|
R. Brownsword et al., supra, note 11, at 4-5. Role of Dignity
in Biolaw” (2003) 23 Ox. J.L.S. 319.
|
|
See also D. Dwyer, “Beyond Autonomy: The
|
|
generally viewed as the least justified.61
Nonetheless, one cannot conclude that they detract from the propriety of
UNESCO actions.
The Declaration was a response to the
dramatic and alarming rate of scientific advances, particularly genetic ones.
Its conception was marked by several themes: fear that science would
irreversibly damage a fundamental aspect of humanity; hope that a just
society is within human capabilities; and concern that we are far from that society
and sliding in the wrong direction. Despite the negative triggers, it was a
response by a body (UNESCO) entitled and reasonably well placed to act and to
offer leadership in this field. UNESCO’s decision to act signifies its view
that international human rights standards can be transmogrified into
subject-specific ethical rules that can guide biomedical practices regardless
of geographic location or cultural prevalence, and its desire to push society
in a “safe” direction with a specific and comprehensive instrument. Care was
taken to ensure that the IBC was a representative international body
reflective of UNESCO/global membership. Principles may have given way to the
tactics of a specific philosophical/legal perspective,62 with
consequences that may arguably detract from the legitimacy of the drafting
process and the acceptability of the Declaration, but the process was largely
a model of how to ethically draft in an international forum.
Human dignity and the conviction that it
should not be compromised play a dominant role in both the Declaration and
the pre-existing international human rights regime (i.e., the IBR).63
Although one might assess their value on how they advance this principle, “human
dignity” on its own is not a useful analytical tool.64 It is too
vague and flexible,65 capable of being defined both as:
• The idea that humans, regardless of status
or capacity and by virtue of being “human”, have intrinsic or inherent value
and worth and are deserving of respect;66 * and
|
|
See the discussions in Revel, supra, note 58, and J. Harris, “Clones,
Genes and Human Rights” in J. Burley (ed.), supra,
note 14, 61-94.
|
|
62 Or to the natural rigours and pitfalls of the democratic
process, depending on one’s view.
|
|
63 N. Lenoir, supra,
note 10, at 16-17. “Dignity” is mentioned some 15 times: see Preamble and
|
|
arts. 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 21 and 24.
|
|
S. Cowen, “Can Dignity Guide South Africa’s
Equality Jurisprudence?” (2001) 17 S.A.J.H.R. 34-58, at 37-40, states that
dignity lacks clear meaning and must be supplemented by other values to
usefully serve as a conceptual tool.
|
|
65
|
|
R. Macklin, supra,
note 20, at 220-221. M. Bedjaoui, Proceedings
of the Third Session of the
IBC,
vol. 1 (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), at 144, stated that “human dignity” is “full of
fragility”.
|
|
See D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw
(Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 2001), at 15-17, and P. Walsh, “Principles and
Pragmatism” (1995) 3 M.L.R. 237250.
|
|
•
The particular cultural understanding of the inner moral worth of the human
“person” (which can include family, friends, foes, ancestors and successors)
and his or her proper political relation with society.67
It is used both as an empowering force
(grounding individual rights and freedom of choice) and as a constraining
force (forbidding “instrumentalization” of the body).68
As such, both the pre-existing regime and
the Declaration are more appropriately evaluated by assessing the extent to
which they coherently define and further other dignity-related values, being,
in no particular order, (1) autonomy, (2) equality, and (3) solidarity.
Autonomy rests on the broad notion of valuing people as physical,
psychological, economical and legal entities.69 It affirms the
human capacity for selfdetermination that entitles individuals to some level
of self-rule, and it therefore grounds rights such as confidentiality and
freedom from coercion.70 Equality also rests on the worth/value of
humans. It promotes justice by stipulating that all humans are equal before
the law and deserving of equitable treatment by, and fair distribution of,
the benefits of law. It grounds the right not to be discriminated against.71
Solidarity, comprising elements of beneficence and non-maleficence, is
the natural unity of humanity: the common cause with fellow man. It imposes
on everyone duties of mercy, altruism, and charitableness and the duty to
avoid doing harm.72
These three values are arguably more
definable and measurable than “human dignity” standing alone. Also and
importantly, they capture multiple conceptions of “human dignity”, which, I
believe, increases their validity. Although they may not be completely free
of the vagaries that limit the utility of “human dignity” as a measuring
stick (i.e., a certain interpretive flexibility), they are more easily dealt
with and therefore preferable.
The
international human rights regime was and continues to be dominated by the
IBR. Although not specifically directed at the potential negative
consequences of genetic advances, the IBR may be relevant in that it promotes
autonomy, equality and solidarity and their related rights, and it can be
applied in a variety of contexts,
|
|
See
K. Pannikar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?” 383-389, at
387, and R. Howard, “Dignity, Community and Human Rights” 398-400, at 399,
both in H. Steiner & P. Alston (eds.), supra,
note 21.
|
|
D.
Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, “Human Dignity, Rights and Genetics” in R. Brownsword et al. (eds.), supra, note 11,
69-88, at 88. R. Brownsword, “Regulating Human Genetics: New Dilemmas for a
New Millenium” (2004) 12 M.L.R. 14, online at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional.
[hereinafter paginated 1-19], at 4, describes the forces that oversaw the
creation of the Declaration as a “dignitarian alliance” who uses “human
dignity” as a constraining force.
|
|
69 See S. Aksoy & A. Elmali, “The Core Concepts Of The
‘Four Principles’ Of Bioethics As Found In Islamic Tradition” (2002) 21 Med.
Law 211-224, G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice
of Autonomy (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), at 6. T.
Beauchamp & R. Faden, The History and Theory
of Informed Consent (Oxford: OUP, 1986), at 7.
|
|
70 O. O’Neill, Autonomy
and Trust in Bioethics (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
at 23.
|
|
71
at
52.
|
|
T. Beauchamp & J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th
ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1994),
|
|
including the genetic context. Further, the
IBR is supported and reaffirmed by subsequent instruments directed
specifically at the interaction of science and human rights.
With reference to the touchstones identified
above, the significance of this regime for genetics is as follows:
•
Autonomy-related provisions erect rights (1)
of access to healthcare advances, (2) of non-coercion of patients/subjects,
and (3) to pursue research. Article 25 (UDHR) and art. 12 (ICESCR) confirm an
individual right to healthcare. Article 27 (UDHR) states that everyone has
the right to participate in cultural life and share in scientific
advancement, thus supporting the right to undertake research. Article 7
(ICCPR) erects the necessity of participant consent. All of these rights are
logically applicable to and exercisable in the genetic context, such as the
right of access to genetic healthcare, the right to genetic research, and the
requirement of consent to genetic treatment and research. The Tehran
Declaration,73 noting that scientific developments may endanger
individual or group rights and human dignity, recommends that states study
problems regarding the “protection of the human personality and its physical
and intellectual integrity in view of the progress in biology, medicine and
biochemistry.”
•
Equality-related provisions erect rights of
non-discrimination. Article 7 (UDHR) states that all are equal before the law
and are entitled to equal protection of the law. This could be invoked to bar
discrimination based on genetic disability or predisposition. Article 23
(UDHR) affirms the family as entitled to protection and could be used to
prevent states from limiting choices about marriages or reproduction based on
genetics. Articles 22 and 23 (UDHR) enshrine the rights of employment, choice
of employment, favourable work conditions, and realization of the economic,
social and cultural rights essential to human dignity. They are supportive of
a requirement that states prevent alterations to social relations and
practices that reduce the access of some groups to employment, healthcare,
and insurance.74
•
Solidarity provisions erect rights to share in
genetic advances and duties to share these advances. Article 27 (UDHR) and
art. 15 (ICESCR) state that everyone
has the right to “share in” or “enjoy” the benefits of scientific advancement
and resultant applications. Individuals or groups could use these to demand
access to new treatments and to share in advances currently enjoyed unevenly.
Article 12 (ICESCR) directs states to take steps for the prevention of
occupational, endemic, and epidemic diseases. The UN General Assembly has
called for states to take measures to ensure that the results of science and
technology are used only for the benefit of humankind.75 * Although
not directed at humans per se, the Convention on Biological
|
|
73
|
|
Final Act of the International Conference
on Human Rights, Tehran, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41
|
|
(1968).
|
|
74 A. Iles, supra,
note 46, at 36.
|
|
75 General Assembly Resolution 48/140, UN GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, UN Doc.
|
|
A/48/49 (vol. 1) (1994).
|
|
Diversity76
addresses the need to protect, inter alia,
biological diversity, which includes genetic diversity.77 It
espouses sharing technology so as to exploit and preserve biological and
genetic resources,78 and it envisions sharing knowledge, research,
and biotechnology with developing states.79
In addition, and on a more general note, the
Scientific and Technological Progress Declaration80 emphasizes the
need to neutralize present and possible future harmful consequences of
scientific developments, including their interference with individual and
group human rights.
All told, the IBR and subsequent instruments
create a matrix of values and rights evocable in the genetics context. They
could be used by states, which must take statutory steps to secure their
domestic realization, as touchstones for formulating ethical,
human-rights-sensitive genetic policy.81 Individuals or groups
could also use them as support for human rights claims: the Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR has enforcement provisions that can be invoked by individuals.82
With respect to monitoring, the UN Commission on Human Rights has already
invited states and NGOs to inform it of measures taken to ensure that science
develops in a manner respectful of human rights.83
In
short, although the IBR and related pre-existing instruments were not created
with genetics in mind, they form a useful complex latticework of instruments.
However, that latticework has gaps in its protection. For example, the
pre-existing regime does not make explicitly clear that the genome needs
protection. Further, it fails to address, much less answer, some of the
dominant health and human rights related concerns and questions raised by the
new genetics. For example:84
1)
What criteria should be used for identifying
permissible genetic research?
2)
What type of consent is most appropriate in
the genetic context?
3)
How can we promote and realize the even
distribution of benefits?
|
|
76
77
78
79
80
|
|
(1992)
31 I.L.M. 818, signed by 157 states.
See
the Preamble.
|
|
See
arts 1, 2 and 7.
|
|
See
arts. 12, 15, 16, 17 and 18.
|
|
Declaration on the Use of Scientific and
Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and
for the Benefit of Mankind, GA Res. 3384,
UN GAOR, 30th Sess., UN Doc. A/Res./3384 (1975).
|
|
81 Such an approach is discussed in B. Knoppers,
“Reflections: The Challenge of Biotechnology and Public Policy” (2000) 45
McGill L.J. 559-566.
|
|
82 See arts. 1 to 6.
|
|
83 CHR Resolution 91, UN GAOR, CHR, 49th Sess., 67th mtg., UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122 (1993). See also Resolution 71 (1997)
(non-discrimination in the field of health) and Resolution 11 (1989) (human
rights and bioethics).
|
|
84 The field of genetics and human rights obviously raises
many, many more questions than these. For example, see J. Legemaate,
“Integrating Health Law and Health Policy: A European Perspective” (2002) 60
Health Policy 101-110, M. Latham & S. Leonard, “The European Convention
on Biomedicine and the Human Rights Act 1998: Grasping the Nettle of
Biomedicine?” in J. Tingle et al. (eds.), Healthcare Law: The Impact of
the Human Rights Act 1998 (London: Cavendish, 2001) 331346,
and more. However, these are the more obvious and regularly debated questions
that the IBR leaves unanswered, and therefore grounds support for the
creation of additional
regulation.
|
|
4)
Is the patenting of human genetic material
appropriate and under what conditions?
5)
How can we combat the rise of science-based
determinism and discrimination?
6)
What are the proper protection and disclosure
mechanisms for genetic information?
Although this does not represent a
comprehensive list of genetically related concerns, it represents some of the
main questions left unanswered, and lends support to Prof. Mayor’s view that
something specific, modern, and proactive was necessary: a need existed and
the Declaration was designed to respond to that need.85
The Declaration contains a Preamble which
recalls the ideals and remit of UNESCO, identifies the international
instruments relied on and highlights the risks represented by genetic
advances. Its seven Sections purport to lay down universal bioethical
standards that will ensure genetic advances are not used in a manner contrary
to human rights.86 Conclusions can be drawn about the
Declaration’s significance and proper place in the international bioethical
and human rights scene based on the extent to which the Declaration (1) gives
the touchstone values of autonomy, equality and solidarity effect in the genetic
context through the articulation of understandable and internally consistent
substantive rights, and (2) answers the questions identified above which
represent gaps in the pre-existing regime.
3.2.1 Autonomy
Although
usually relating to individually exercisable choice, the international
application of autonomy can be complicated by its occasional use with
reference to the social unit.87 This has implications when it
comes to autonomy-based rights such as confidentiality and freedom from
coercion. The Declaration appears to acknowledge this tension, but fails to
deal with it, never consistently articulating its concept of the value or
rationally supporting its patchwork support for autonomy’s concomitant
rights.
|
|
85
|
|
H. Espiell, supra,
note 33.
|
|
Section A, “Human Dignity and the Human
Genome” (arts. 1-4), is directed at protecting the human genome itself.
Section B, “Rights of the Persons Concerned” (arts. 5-9), deals with
procedures relating to the genome, which are likely to have physical,
psychological, economic, social or other consequences for the individual or
the group to which she or he belongs. Section C, “Research on the Human
Genome” (arts. 10-12), addresses limitations on the right of research.
Section D, “Conditions for the Exercise of Scientific Activity” (arts.
13-16), enunciates state and individual responsibilities regarding research.
Section E, “Solidarity and International Cooperation” (arts. 17-19), espouses
solidarity and international cooperation with the hope that it will result in
all humanity benefiting from genetic advances. Section F, “Promotion of the
Principles Set Out in the Declaration” (arts. 20-21), is aimed at promotion
of the Declaration core principles and the establishment of bioethics as part
of the culture of the future. Section G, “Implementation of the Declaration”
(arts. 22-25), unique to a nonbinding instrument, suggests that states take
all appropriate measures and makes implementation recommendations, including
the outline of UNESCO activities.
|
|
87
|
|
See A. Taylor, supra,
note 8, at 491 and his note 98.
|
|
Article 4 constitutes an outright autonomy
limitation. It prohibits individuals from gaining financially from the genome
“in its natural state”. The absence of this prohibition from the Preliminary
Outline, and the debate over its content and impact on existing intellectual
property rights, suggest that it was a matter of controversy and that the
Declaration represents a compromise position:
[S]hould there be a reference in the
preamble to the international instruments concerning the protection of
intellectual property rights? [S]hould a new article be added ...for the
prohibition of all forms of appropriation or marketing of the results of
genome research? Any prohibition ... of patenting the results of
[genetic] research ... would have a significant impact on research
itself, since prohibiting all possibility of gaining commercial benefits
would be liable to discourage research ... .
It would be difficult to address the ... patenting
of human genetic sequences in the UNESCO context alone, particularly in view
of the economic interests at stake. The need for balance between the
imperative of free access to the results of genome research and the
investment essential for developing that research must be borne in mind. .
The Chairperson . was of the opinion that
UNESCO could not go any further in the declaration with regard to the
question of patentability, in view of the many interests at stake. 88
Given
the ability of third parties to gain financially from the human genome
through the patenting of genes and gene sequences,89 the ethical
soundness of a prohibition limited to individual gene originators is
questionable.90 Indeed, the IBC subsequently issued an Advice91
alleging strong ethical grounds for excluding the human genome from
patentability, and recommending that the WTO clarify that patenting the human
genome is contrary to the public interest. The prevalence of
cross-national/cultural opposition to patenting,92 and the
potential for industry/economic concerns to drive genetic policy
(particularly in developing states trying to close the economic gap with
|
|
88
|
|
H. Espiell, supra,
note 33, at 58-59.
|
|
In
America, Australia, Europe and Japan. In South Africa, the courts have
endorsed the idea that patents create useful incentives for pharmaceutical
companies to supply healthcare providers and invest in research: see Syntheta (Pty) Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutical NV et al.,
[1999] 1 S.A. 85 (C.A.).
|
|
9 See
R. Brownsword, “Dolly, Dignity and the Genetics Debate” (1998) 148 New L.J.
413, and
|
|
D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, “Patenting
Human Genes: Legality, Morality and Human Rights” in J. Harris (ed.), Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds
(London: Kluwer, 1998) 9-24.
|
|
91
Advice of the IBC on the Patentability of the Human Genome, UNESCO IBC, 8th
Sess., Paris, September 12-14, 2001.
|
|
92 See C. Leng, “Human Genome
and Population Genetics Research and the Third World: Some Points for
Consideration” in Proceedings of the Third
Session of the IBC, vol. II (Paris: UNESCO, 1995) 37-45, at
39-40, who identifies a host of organizations mobilizing against patenting,
including NGOs, IGOs, religious and indigenous groups.
|
|
industrialized states),93 further
suggest that the Declaration’s failure to squarely address patenting is a
serious lacunae.94
Article 5, although not as philosophically
confused as the Declaration’s stance on gene ownership and financial gain,
nonetheless triggers concerns. It stipulates, inter alia,
that all patients/subjects:
a)
Are entitled to full disclosure of the
potential risks and benefits of the treatment/research;
b)
Must be competent and provide free and
informed consent, or authorization must be otherwise obtained according to
law; and
c)
Have the right to decide whether to be informed
of results.
On its face, the article seems beneficial and
obviously addresses concerns about autonomy. However, the utility of its
stipulations in practice are unclear, a fact which reduces the Declarations
comprehensibility and, by implication, its significance.
For example, stipulation (a) offers little
guidance as to the meaning of “full disclosure”.95 In the genetic context, physicians and
counselors ought to
communicate the (i) objective, type and
reliability of tests; (ii) risk of tests; (iii) possibility of unexpected
results; and (iv) possible psychophysical repercussions. Post-testing,
physicians and counselors ought to (i) verify that all information has been
understood; (ii) inquire regarding consequences; and (iii) provide or direct
patients or subjects to support.96 No such criteria are provided.
Stipulation
(b) offers no guidance as to the components of or participants in ethical
“consent” in the genetic context. Should it in all circumstances be exercised
by the subject/patient alone or jointly with others? Can it be exercised
entirely by others? Under what conditions? Inclusion of the requirements that
consent be “obtained in the manner prescribed by law” and “guided by the
person’s best interests” were allegedly added to accommodate those
jurisdictions where the family or community play a role in consent decisions.97
Many argue that it is never proper to dispense with first-person consent.98
Even if it can be, the Declaration fails to recognize that
|
|
See
S. Pepa et al., “Research and Trade in
Genetics: How Countries Should Structure for the Future” (1998) 17 Med. Law
437-454.
|
|
For
more on gene patenting generally, see M. Kirby, supra,
note 4, at 45-46, G. Laurie, “Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin” [2004] 2
E.I.P.R. 59-66, R. Gold, “Biomedical Patents and Ethics: A Canadian Solution”
(2000) 45 McGill L.J. 413-435, R. Ford, “The Morality of Biotech Patents:
Differing Legal Obligations in Europe” [1997] E.I.P.R. 315-318, and L. Bently
& B. Sherman, “The Ethics of Patenting: Towards a Transgenic Patent
System” (1995) 3 Med. Law 275-291.
|
|
An
issue that is discussed in J. Kegley, “Genetics Decision Making: A Template
for Problems with Informed Consent” (2002) 21 Med. Law 459-471, and J.
Kegley, “An Ethical Imperative: Genetics Education for Physicians and
Patients” (2003) 22 Med. Law 275-284.
|
|
96
|
|
A. Conti et
al., “Informed Consent When Taking Genetic Decisions” (2004) 23 Med.
Law
|
|
337-355, at 344.
|
|
97
|
|
H. Espiell, supra,
note 33, at 76.
|
|
See
C. Ijsselmuiden & R. Faden, supra,
note 58. A. Iles, supra,
note 46, at 28, points out that, ultimately, human rights centre on the
individual’s life and experience and seek to alleviate unfairness and avoid
injury starting with the individual. R. McCorquodale &
R. Fairbrother, supra, note 48, at 766,
quote Eleanor Roosevelt as follows: “Where after all do universal human
rights begin? In the small places close to home ... . Yet they are the world
of the individual person: the neighbourhood he lives in; the school or
college he attends; the factory, farms or office where he works. Such are the
|
|
consent is not an event but a process the
participants of which may develop but which must start
with the individual,* 99 and it fails to grapple with the
implications for the patient/subject’s art. 7 privacy rights when
first-person consent is dispensed with (i.e., who properly receives
information, how much information, etc.).
The permissiveness of stipulation (c) has
been described as contrary to solidarity with family members,100
but is defended as an important autonomy-based right because it empowers the
affected patient/subject to determine his or her exposure to information that
may have severe repercussions for their psychological well being.101
Article 5(d) deals with research protocols,
but fails to enunciate any clear or precise rules, and has been criticized
for its vagueness.102
The one unambiguous autonomy-based provision
is art. 8, which erects the individual right to reparation for damage
sustained as a result of genomic interventions. The IBC oscillated between
the word “reparation” and “compensation” but settled on the former, which
offers states greater latitude to fashion such remedies as best suits their
legal and cultural traditions.103 Inclusion of the word “direct”
was intended to bar actions by descendants.104
Overall, autonomy is not defined, support
for autonomy (as defined above) is equivocal, and its related rights are left
very much to the vagaries of domestic lawmakers, a fact which is further
emphasized by art. 9, a provision which ultimately abdicates the very
function of the Declaration, which is to establish universal thresholds. More
damaging than its failure to deal clearly or cohesively with autonomy as a
value (i.e., what is it and is it essential in the genetics and rights
settings), is its failure to offer sound guidance as to the minimum
internationally acceptable ethical requirements for (1) observing consent and
(2) protecting confidentiality where consent is not first-person. Even if
individual self-rule is assumed, it fails to address how existing social,
economic and political pressures may circumscribe or distort the choices
individuals make in the genetic context.105
3.2.2 Equality
A
common fear is that genetic information—which is increasingly specific,
accurate and voluminous—will be used to define and classify people according
to race, ethnicity, or other markers such as existence of deficiencies or
physical/mental potentialities, and will generally become a tool by which to
perpetuate existing or
|
|
places where every man, woman or child seeks
equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination.
Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere.”
|
|
99
K. Berger, “Informed Consent: Information or Knowledge?” (2003) 22 Med. Law
743-750.
|
|
100
436.
|
|
See J. Harris & K. Keywood, “Ignorance,
Information and Autonomy” (2001) 22 T.M.B. 415-
|
|
See R. Andorno, supra,
note 41, at 6, where he notes that, in any event, the right is not
|
|
absolute;
physicians can override this aspect of confidentiality per art. 9 when treatment is available
for
|
|
others
who may be affected.
|
|
102
103
|
|
See
A. Taylor, supra, note 8,
at 510. H. Espiell, supra, note 33,
at 59.
|
|
104
105
|
|
H.
Espiell, ibid, at 5.
|
|
create new social, economic or power
divisions and inequalities.106 Thus, equality is a cornerstone
value of the Declaration.107
Article 2 stipulates that everyone is equal
in dignity regardless of their genetic makeup (i.e., even if new technology
discloses genetic illness or predisposition). Together with art. 3, which
claims that the genome evolves and is influenced by natural and social
environments, it rejects genetic determinism, which tries to explain all
human personality and behaviour on the basis of genes.108 They
“attempt to avoid the division of human society into ‘genetically valid’ and
‘genetically non-valid’ members, which would constitute a disastrous effect
of scientific knowledge [and] ... would weaken the proper foundation of
democracy.”109
Article 6 reflects the anti-discrimination
policy common to many international instruments,110 extending the
prohibited grounds to genetic characteristics. However, this right never
becomes “concrete” because the article offers no guidance as to what
practices diminish an individual’s or group’s right to human dignity. For
example, it does not address:111
1)
The use of genetic markers to delineate
groups;112
2)
The significance of unequal access to genetic
testing and treatment or the use of testing to determine access to treatment
(i.e., surgeries, transplants, etc.); or
3)
The use of genetic criteria to determine
access to insurance, social benefits, employment, promotion, or property.
Further,
it offers no insight as to what international law demands for equal treatment
in light of one’s genetic circumstances—there are no samples of conduct that
is unacceptable to underline the scope of the right). Finally, it makes no
suggestions as to the appropriate consequences to states, other entities or
individuals of infringing equality rights.113
|
|
See
A. Caplan, “Handle With Care: Race, Class and Genetics” in T. Murphy & M.
Lappe (eds.), Justice and the Human Genome
Project (Berkeley: U. of al. Press, 1994), and many more.
|
|
107
See Preamble, paras. 1, 4 and 6.
|
|
Genetic determinists try to explain all
human personality/behaviour on the basis of genes. They draw teleological
sustenance from behavioural geneticists, who try to isolate and identify
genes relevant to specific behavioural traits and discover modes of
intervention. For more on this, see D. Glick & H. Soreg, “Ethics, Public
Policy and Behavioural Genetics” (2003) 5 I.M.A.J. 83-86, and National
Research Council, “Human Rights and Human Genetic Variation Research” in M.
Mann et al. (eds.), supra, note 56, 380-394.
|
|
109
|
|
R. Andorno, supra,
note 41, at 4
|
|
For
example, see the UDHR, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the
Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation
(1958), the Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1960), the
International Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1965), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978), the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979).
|
|
111
|
|
A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 47.
|
|
On
this point, N. Papadimitrou & A. Ryan, “Chief Scientist Bob May Lambasts
Human Genetics Panel (2001) 7 Sci. Soc. 9, report that research continues to
seek “intelligence genes”, “pleasant traits genes” and “gay genes”.
|
|
113
|
|
Probably because there is no enforcement
mechanism and thus no reason to develop sanctions
|
|
Article 7 ties into art. 6 by addressing
equality in relation to genetic information; it aims to avoid discrimination
by keeping such information confidential.114 Specific protection
was desired because genetic information:115
•
Has implications for the current and future
health of the patient or subject, asymptomatic blood relations, and future
(unborn) relatives;
•
Does not change from in
utero to post-death, and offers some certainty in determining
who will be affected by genetic disease;
•
Is unique in the continued existence of
massive shortfalls between conditions that can be identified and those that
can be treated or cured; and
•
Documented instances already exist of genetic
discrimination in the insurance and employment contexts.116
However, art. 7 fails to address the
circumstances when confidentiality may be breached or the criteria for doing
so.117
Overall, although obviously supportive of
equality, the Declaration is vague and equivocal and leaves much to domestic
lawmakers with respect to defining what infringes this right. It also fails
to address control over the activities of private corporations.118
3.2.3 Solidarity
The
Declaration addresses solidarity both philosophically and practically.
Philosophically, art. 1 affirms the “fundamental unity” of the human species
and the value of preserving it. Art. 1 also stresses our inter-relatedness,
common genetic blueprint and shared future by stating that the human genome
is, symbolically, “the heritage of humanity”.119 This notion is
intended to convey the idea that the human genome engages a responsibility
from and for all of humanity and:120
|
|
or
remedies, although a provision akin to art. 8 might have been added to
punctuate the right.
|
|
114 The Declaration does not
specify what constitutes a violation of the right to genetic privacy, but
UNESCO has since adopted the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data
(2003).
|
|
H. Espiell, supra,
note 33, at 4, R. Andorno, supra,
note 41, at 6, I. Ellis et al.,
“Retained Human Tissue: A Molecular Genetic Goldmine or Modern Grave Robbing?
A Legal Approach to
|
|
Obtaining
and Using Stored Human Samples” (2003) 22 Med. Law 357-372, G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms
(Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2002), at 92-105, K. Mason et al., Law and Medical Ethics, 6th
ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002), at 207-212, T. Murray, “Genetic
Exceptionalism and ‘Future Diaries’: Is Genetic Information Different from
Other Medical Information?” in M. Rothstein (ed.), Genetic Secrets (London: Yale U. Press,
1997), 60-76. See also House of Lords Select Committee of Science &
Technology, “Fourth Report: Human Genetic Databases” (2000) at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id200001/Idselect/Idsctech/57/5701.htm
(Mar. 4/04).
|
|
N. Holtzman & D. Shapiro, “The New
Genetics: Genetic Testing and Public Policy” (1998) 316 B.M.J. 852-856, at
854. See also T. Lemmons, “Selective Justice, Genetic Discrimination and
Insurance: Should We Single Out Genes in Our Laws?” (2000) 45 McGill L.J.
347-412.
|
|
117
|
|
A. Black, “Confidentiality and Drivers
License Authorities” (2003) 22 Med. Law 333-343.
|
|
A. Iles, supra, note 46,
at 49. The issue of cross-border transfers of medical information and the
desperate need for universal regulation of same is addressed in H. Abbing,
“Medical Confidentiality and Electronic Patient Files” (2000) 19 Med. Law
107-112.
|
|
119
|
|
A phrase modified from the “common heritage
of humanity”, which was coined by A. Pardo
|
|
1)
Is not suitable for appropriation by any state
or private entity;
2)
Requires a management system in which all
users have rights and benefits are shared; and
3)
Is reserved for peaceful purposes and
preserved for future generations.
Unfortunately, this premise is weakened by
the Declaration’s failure to address or condemn gene patenting, which
represents the greatest risk of “appropriation” and which is currently
“managed” through a “system” widely criticized as inappropriate to medicine,
genetics, and the protection of human rights (the latter of which is not even
a patentability factor).
On the practical level, although accepting
that the right to pursue research, necessary for the progress of knowledge
and freedom of thought, is a human right,121 the Declaration’s
conception of solidarity is linked with state/group and individual duties
rather than rights. With respect to states, the Declaration directs that
they:
•
Foster conditions favourable for ethical
research, (2) ensure that research is not used for non-peaceful purposes, and
(3) recognize the value of establishing multidisciplinary ethics committees
independent from political, economic, scientific and medical authorities;122
•
Ensure solidarity towards genetically
vulnerable individuals, families and populations by fostering research on the
identification, prevention and treatment of genetically-based and influenced
diseases, both rare and endemic;123
•
Practice international solidarity toward
developing states by disseminating scientific knowledge so that advances can
be enjoyed by everyone, and the rich/poor and developed/developing gap does
not widen;124
•
Encourage measures that will enable developing
states to benefit from scientific and technological research.125
|
|
(Malta)
and used in various instruments such as the European Convention on Human
Rights (1950), the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International
Cultural Cooperation (1966), the Declaration of Principles Governing the
Seabed and Ocean Floor (1970), and the Convention on the Law of the Sea
(1982). Although used in the Preliminary Outline, it was dropped in favour of
the modified form because of fears that it might be interpreted in commercial
terms or used to dilute individual rights in favour of eugenic policies: see
H. Espiell, supra, note 33,
at 3, and R. Ida, “Human Genome as Common Heritage of Humankind” in N. Fujiki
& D. Macer (eds.), Bioethics in Asia
(Tsukuba: Eubios Ethics Institute, 1998) 59-63.
|
|
120
|
|
R. Andorno, supra,
note 41, at 3.
|
|
See art. 12, as well as the ICESCR, the
UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers (1974), and Y.
Dinstein, “Technological Development, Equality and Non-Discrimination” in L.
Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), supra,
note 2, 215-222, at 216. See also Huvig
v. France (1990), 12 E.H.R.R. 528
(E.C.H.R.), and Niemietz v. Germany (1992), 16 E.H.R.R. 97
(E.C.H.R.), in the European context.
|
|
122 See arts. 14, 15 and 16.
|
|
See
art. 17. D. Resnik, “The Distribution of Biomedical Research Resources and
International Justice” (2004) 4 D.W.B. 42-57, reports that less than 10% of
research funds are directed at addressing the problems responsible for 90% of
the world’s burden of disease.
|
|
However, it offers no guidance or concrete
recommendations as to how solidarity between nations might be manifested
(i.e., no models of global assistance to ensure access to genetic advances
are identified).125 126
With respect to individuals, art. 10
stipulates that human rights must take precedence over research. Article 12
stipulates that the benefits of research and advances should be made available
to all, and that research shall be directed to the improvement of health and
relief from suffering. Article 13 identifies the ethical duties incumbent on
every researcher (i.e., meticulousness, caution, intellectual honesty, and
integrity). The Declaration also contains research prohibitions identified as
contrary to human dignity; namely (1) human reproductive cloning (art. 11),127
and (2) germ-line interventions (art. 24).128
These prohibitions belie claims that (1) the
IBC is merely a forum for exchanging ideas and facilitating understanding
that does not pass judgment on specific practices,129 and (2) the
Declaration enunciates principles, not regulates scientific or medical
practice.130 Although they are defended, in part, on the basis
that domestic and international prohibitions already exist,131
there is no indication how the processes are contrary to human dignity.132 Indeed, the ethical basis of these blanket
claims/bans is questionable, particularly
when used to restrict practices which may pass ethical muster on a
case-by-case basis as technology progresses and understanding increases.133
Their inclusion has led to allegations that the Declaration ignores the fact
that entirely beneficial consequences should be a factor in determining the propriety
of practices.134 In addition, they create certain internal
inconsistencies:
It
is difficult to reconcile these different viewpoints, one saying that human
dignity “makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic
characteristics ” and the other that “deliberate
|
|
125 See art. 19.
|
|
126
|
|
As noted by A. Taylor, supra, note 8, at 510.
|
|
Very generally, human reproductive cloning
is a means of producing a human chromosomally and genetically identical to
another. For more on the process, see M. Lupton, supra,
note 13, and M. Revel, supra,
note 58.
|
|
Very generally, germline gene therapy is a
means of producing a human using reproductive cells that have undergone a
permanent genetic modification. For more on the process, see M. Revel, ibid.
|
|
See F. Mayor, supra,
note 54, at 66, and www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=Social Sciences/Ethics/Bioethics (May 21/04).
|
|
130 H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 58, citing the
comments at the 5th Meeting of the Legal Commission.
|
|
131
|
|
R. Andorno, supra,
note 41, at 7-9.
|
|
132 Failure to ethically
substantiate these claims is common among the cloning bans: see M.
|
|
Lupton, supra,
note 13, at 110-114.
|
|
See
the sound and incisive critique of the reproductive cloning ban by J. Harris,
supra, note 61. Both D. Beyleveld &
R. Brownsword, supra, note 66,
at 155, and L. Ulrich, “Reproductive Rights and Genetic Disease” in J. Humber
& R. Almeder (eds.), supra,
note 2, 351-360, at 359, identify some ethical arguments supportive of
cloning or “infant design” rights.
|
|
creation
of genetically identical human beings is contrary to human dignity. ”135
A more balanced approach providing
reasonable criteria for consideration of practices currently viewed as
questionable was inexplicably eschewed.
Overall, although the Declaration espouses
solidarity (via researcher responsibilities and
state sharing of biotechnological advances so everyone can benefit from emerging
medical techniques), its position is not entirely coherent. With reference to
the definition above, although the Declaration certainly seeks to avoid harm
through certain of its provisions, it may be over-inclusive by banning
practices which may help patients and ultimately promote beneficence and
justice by expanding treatment options.
The above demonstrates that the Declaration
addresses the values of autonomy, equality, and solidarity and their
concomitant rights (consent, confidentiality, nondiscrimination) and duties
(information sharing, avoiding “dangerous” practices) in the genetic context
in a broad manner only. It is claimed that the Declaration is:
1)
An attempt to “get things moving on the
international level [and] to stimulate further international and regional
activity;”136
2)
“[A] call to attention” to states to make them
aware of the ethical issues that genomic research presents;137
3)
“[N]ot ... a final expression of international
consensus and policy on advances in genetic science [but] a first step toward
stimulating international debate and cooperation,”138 and
4)
“[J]ust the first step towards the elaboration
of an international biomedical law.”139
Viewed
as such, and appreciating the need to accommodate diverse social, cultural,
political, and socioeconomic backgrounds and the futility of seeking dramatic
change, the Declaration is useful; an understandably cautious approach that
distilled a few basic rules from harmonized principles.140 So
characterized, it has been described as “the most thorough global initiative
to date addressing the need to protect human rights with respect to genetic
advances.”141 * Further, the inclusion of implementation
|
|
M. Revel, supra,
note 58, at 710, who highlights the irreconcilability of arts. 2, 3 and 11.
M. Kirby, supra, note 32, Q-1 and Q-3.
|
|
135
|
|
136
|
|
137 R. Andorno, supra,
note 41, at 10, cites an E. Benda (Germany), interview in the Frankfurter
|
|
Rundschau,
given on November 1, 1997.
|
|
A.
Taylor, supra, note 8, at 511.
|
|
R.
Andorno, supra, note 20, at 959.
|
|
R.
Andorno, ibid, at 962.
|
|
A.
Taylor, supra, note 8, at 509.
|
|
138
139
140
141
|
|
mechanisms could, in the long run, improve
the continued life and relevance of the Declaration.142
Insofar as the above is true, the criticisms
leveled against it may be overly specific/rigorous and unfair. However, this
is an instrument that claims to offer guiding principles. As such, it should
be expected to guide, but it fails to do so in many important respects (i.e.,
the core values were not addressed in a comprehensive, coherent or internally
consistent manner, no new rights were articulated to match the new scientific
reality, paradigmatic and systemic issues were ignored).143 In
addition:
[T]he Declaration ... overlooks
a wide variety of issues ... . For example, the Declaration
does not discuss human embryo research, genetic techniques to choose the sex
of children or the permissible uses of therapeutic abortion for genetic
disorders, including the nature and extent of reproductive autonomy and the limitations
on government interventions in reproductive decision-making.144
Its failures may stem from its origins as a
reaction to genetic advances (specifically cloning), its self-imposed time
pressure,145 or the political limitations under which the IBC worked.146
Regardless, its “cursory treatment of the most intricate problems”147 means
that it only minimally advances the understanding of the interaction between
genetics and the values and rights addressed.
Further,
and more importantly, it suffers from the same weaknesses identified with
respect to the pre-existing regime in that it fails to answer the questions
important in the medical context that it left unanswered. Although
identifying “inappropriate” research, it fails to defend its position (Q-1).
It addresses consent, but not really in a manner wholly relevant to
situations with genetic implications (Q-2). Although reiterating that
benefits must be shared, it elaborates no mechanisms for even distribution
(Q-3). It takes no stand on the patentability of human genetic material
(Q-4). It certainly makes clear its position on determinism and
discrimination, but offers no positive response when they raise their ugly
head (Q-5). It identifies no disclosure mechanisms for genetic information
(Q-6). By its frequent deference to domestic lawmakers, it fails to provide a
universal response that will guard against
|
|
M. Gavouneli, “Binding Character and
Implementation Control of International Instruments on Biomedicine” in L.
Sicilianos & M. Gavouneli (eds.), supra,
note 2, 197-211, at 202-204. However, M. Wadman & D. Butler, “UNESCO
Declaration Lacks Legal Teeth” (1998) 391 Nature 219, note that international
supervision of state responses to non-binding Declarations is minimal.
Further, UNESCO has had difficulty establishing itself as a centre for
implementation: see A. Taylor, supra,
note 8, at 528, and the sources cited in his note 405.
|
|
For example, the public-private divide (all
the more important in the new global reality) and the resultant gaps in
protection were ignored. For more on this, see H. Undersmith & C.
Chinkin, “The Gender of Jus Cogens”
(1993) 15 H.R. Quart. 63-73.
|
|
144 A. Taylor, supra,
note 8, at 510-511.
|
|
145 Given the rapidity with which scientific advances were
proceeding, the IBC was encouraged to conclude its work with all due haste
and, in any event, by 1998, the jubilee of the UDHR: see H. Espiell, supra, note 33, at 43-44.
|
|
146 R. Andorno, supra,
note 41, at 2, notes that “the drafters ... were clearly aware of the fact
that if they had decided to prepare a binding instrument, [it] would never
have been approved.”
|
|
147 See A. Iles, supra,
note 46, at 43. M. Gavouneli, supra,
note 142, 197-211, also notes that the Declaration contains only vague
normative content.
|
|
piecemeal legislation and a “race to the
bottom”. As such, it comes under just criticism.
All told, the Declaration is not a failure,
but an equivocal success; perhaps a better example of “knee-jerk reaction”
than “lengthened foresight”. One could reasonably describe it as an exercise
in pragmatic ethics that embodies a reiteration
of existing
general human rights principles in the genetic context. It underlines
the importance of autonomy, equality and solidarity to genetics and emphasizes
the need to ensure that advances reflect human rights standards, but it does
little to articulate how this might be done “on the ground”. Ultimately,
massive gaps remain, permitting dramatically varying practices. Although the
issues are more clearly articulated in the genetic context by the
Declaration, it fails to respond fully to those issues, and so the need that
existed continues.
The stunning genetic achievements of the
late 20th and early 21st centuries necessitate “lengthened foresight”, not
only because of the consequences they can have for future generations, but
because the forms of oppression permitted by them are non-traditional (i.e.,
relating more to the often-invisible distribution of life opportunities).148
Globalization combined with the nature of
genetics itself demands a cooperative and universalist regulatory approach.
The pre-existing regime was neither cohesive nor specific enough to address
the concerns raised by the new genetics. Thus, UNESCO and its IBC tried to
improve matters and exercise this “lengthened foresight” through the
Declaration.
The
drafting process, which identified short- and long-term genetic issues, was
perhaps UNESCO’s greatest success. The debate, the formation of an epistemic
community,149 and the simple existence of a genetics-specific
instrument fostered further debate and prompted manifold bioethical
activities that are ongoing.150 These are unequivocal pluses.
|
|
148 A. Iles, ibid, at
57.
|
|
149
|
|
Which was considered necessary to the
coordination and augmentation of biomedical treaties:
see S. Murphy, supra,
note 14, at 49.
|
|
It
was intended to “get things moving” and to “stimulate further regional and
international activity”, and it has informed the work of many national
bioethics committees: M. Kirby, supra,
note 32, Q-14. Many genetics-related conferences, meetings, symposia and
workshops have discussed the Declaration and it has informed the thinking of
stakeholders in the genetic field: Secretariat, Report
and Evaluation of the Implementation of the Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights, UNESCO, 32nd Sess. of the Gen. Conf.,
UNESCO Doc. 32 C/23 (2003). In the UK, a non- UNESCO member, it was drawn on
by the Human Genetics Advisory Commission and the Human Fertility and
Embryology Authority, Cloning Issues in Reproduction,
Science and Medicine (UK: HGAC/HFEA, 1998), and by the Human
Genetics Commission, Inside Information: Balancing
Interests in the Use of Personal Genetic Data (UK: HGC, 2002):
see R. Brownsword, supra, note 90,
and M. Bale, “Inquiry re: Declaration” at mark.bale@doh.gsi.gov.uk
(May 14/04). See also G. Berlinguer & L. De Castro, Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a
Universal Instrument on Bioethics, UNESCO, 32d Sess. of the
Gen. Conf., UNESCO Doc. SHS/EST/02/CIB-9/5, as well as www.unesco.org and
www.who.int for
further international activities, which include further UNESCO- sponsored
ethical discussions, lectures and training programs.
|
|
For many reasons including vagueness and
internal inconsistencies, the significance of the Declaration itself is more
equivocal. Reliant on a great variety of cultural and political divisions, it
manifests as an instrument of “limited ambition” (i.e., it fails to elucidate
a readily comprehensible goal capable of pressuring responses and clearly
guiding policy-making).151 It thus fails to adequately provide the
reasoned “lengthened foresight” that was considered so vital. Nonetheless,
the Declaration, with its quiet and intermittent influence, must be
considered a limited success.152 Despite being an additional
non-binding instrument in a field littered with unenforceable instruments,
the Declaration is not irrelevant.153 Indeed, time and state
practice may eventually transform the Declaration from soft law into
something more binding.154
A
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis would be necessary to determine whether
the Declaration’s primary values and concomitant rights have been recognized
and given legal effect at the domestic level “out in the world”, and such is
not within the scope of this article. From the practical advancement of these
values and rights in the postDeclaration, one might draw some conclusions as
to the “universality” of the Declaration. Similarly, the “universalizing
dynamic” engendered by the Declaration is another question of interest which
may warrant further consideration.
|
|
151
|
|
A. Iles, supra, note 46, at 59.
|
|
Based on a survey conducted in 2003, UNESCO
claims that the Declaration is widely known and its principles have played a
part in genetic or bioethical legislation or regulations in a number of
member states: Secretariat, supra,
note 150.
|
|
153
|
|
For a discussion on non-compliance with international
instruments, see J. Moore, “Enhancing
Compliance with International Law: A
Neglected Remedy” (1999) 39 Va. J.I.L. 881-1016.
|
|
For more on the transformation of soft law
into binding law, see M. Olivier, “The Relevance of ‘Soft Law’ as a Source of
International Human Rights” (2002) 35 C.I.LJ.S.A. 289-307, at 294-301, who
states that soft law is useful in the transitional stage of development when
the content of international norms are vague and imprecise.
|